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The Japan-born “flying-geese (FG)” theory of growth has recently gained recognition in 
academia and popularity in the media.   Since Kaname Akamatsu introduced his ideas in 
a very broad fashion in the 1930s, opportunities abound for further elaboration and 
application to contemporary development issues.  This paper reviews some of his key 
ideas and presents a reformulation from a new evolutionary structuralist perspective. The 
oft-used, yet vague, concept of “the ladder of economic development” is defined in terms 
of a “leading- sector” stages model, a la Schumpeter—and what comes next as a new 
rung is considered.  The enabling mechanisms of structural upgrading are explored, and 
the dynamics and benefits of an FG formation of aligned countries are stressed.  Also, a 
new stages (FG-theoretic) model of balance-of-payments is introduced to discuss the 
financial issues of “borrowed growth” and “global (G2) imbalances.”  The dynamics of 
structural upgrading and interactive growth via trade and investment within a hierarchy 
of countries is the essence of these reformulated FG models, which make up what is now 
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1.  Introduction 
The so-called “flying-geese (FG)” theory of economic development, originally 
expounded by a Japanese economist, Kaname Akamatsu (1897-1974) of Hitotsubashi 
University in Tokyo, in the 1930s (inter alia, 1935, 1961, 1962), has recently gained 
some currency in academia.  In an article published in the Foreign Affairs, Steven 
Radelet and Jeffrey Sachs (1997) recognize it as one of the three major doctrines of 
catch-up strategy, along with the “big push” and “import substitution or infant industry 
protection.”  The FG theory is also more popularly cited in the media, especially when 
news about Asia’s phenomenal economic growth is reported.  Unfortunately, however, 
Akamatsu presented his ideas in very broad terms without much articulation as a well-
specified theory--so much so that there have occurred some misinterpretations of and 
even confusions about the theory.   
     This paper clarifies the nature of the FG theory by introducing additional analytical 
dimensions to it from a new structuralist perspective.  More specifically, the paper (i) 
briefly reviews the original ideas presented by Akamatsu, mainly the three patterns of FG 
formation he initially conceptualized, (ii) assesses Radelet and Sachs’ interpretations, (iii) 
defines the hitherto casually used notion of “the ladder of economic (or technological) 
development” in terms of an evolutionary model of industrial upgrading, (iv) examines 
the enabling mechanisms of structural transformation in a catching-up country, and (v) 
restates a stages model of balance-of-payments, a framework that is useful in 
understanding the concept of “borrowed growth,” as well as the global economic 
environment that spawned the financial crisis of 2008 and the “global (G2) imbalances.”  
This paper does not intend to survey the existing vast literature on the FG model per se 
but rather to focus and shed new light on the dynamic process of economic development 
under global capitalism. 
 
2.  Three FG patterns    
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Given the fact that Akamatsu’s original ideas were “diamonds in the rough” so to speak, 
the followers of Akamatsu’s ideas have been polishing and elaborating on them, as done 
in numerous works1  
     So, what are Akamatsu’s original ideas?  In essence, he sketched out three separate, 
though intertwined, patterns of FG formation related to the process of industrial 
development in the Asian countries and the changing patterns of dynamic comparative 
advantage among them.  In essence, however, he left the causal mechanisms of structural 
upgrading largely unexplained. 
 
2.1. Import Substitution-Cum-Export Promotion  
A first FG analogy came originally from his empirical findings of the sequential 
development pattern of imports (M) leading to domestic production (P) and then to 
exports (X) (i.e., MPX).  The sequence involved thus goes beyond a process of import 
substitution under protection (i.e., infant industry protection) and ultimately leads to 
exporting.  This sequence was detected in Akamatsu’s statistical analyses of several 
prewar Japanese industries, such as textiles, machine tools, and light machinery, over the 
period of 1870-1939.  Since the sequential trend curves of MPX activities resembled an 
inverted V-shaped flying formation of wild geese, Akamatsu chose the nomenclature, 
“flying-geese.”   It was thus initially a mere pattern identification in terms of such a 
poetic, catchy phrase.  He considered the MPX trend curves kihonkei [basic or 
fundamental pattern].  The sequence of import-substitution-cum-export promotion was 
more recently described by Krugman (1984) as “import protection as export promotion,” 
though unaware of Akamatsu’s original contribution.1  Some major differences, however, 
exist between Akamatsu and Krugman in conceptualizing the intervening causal 
mechanism.  For Krugman, import protection under monopolistic competition leads to 
scale economies (increasing returns), which will eventually enable the protected 
producers to gain price competitiveness.  On the other hand, Akamatsu’s analysis is 
framed in terms of comparative-advantage building; only those industries that are 
                                                 
1 To cite only several references (published in English),  Ginzburg and Simonazzi, 2005; Ito, 2001;  
Korhonen, 1998; Kojima, 2000; Kwan, 1994;  Ozawa, 1992, 2001; Rapp, 1967; Shinohara, 1972, 1982; 
Yamazawa, 1990; UNCTAD, 1995. 
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potentially capable of attaining comparative advantages are given protection for import 
substitution. 2 
 
2.2. Structural Upgrading 
A second FG pattern is a sequence of structural changes in industrial development not 
only in the order of “capital goods following consumer goods” but also “in the 
progression from crude and simple goods to complex and refined goods” (Akamatsu, 
1961).  Both types of qualitative/structural transformation of goods and industries 
themselves are made possible by means of the MPX strategy.  Hence, the FG pattern of 
concomitant industrial and product upgrading can be considered a derivative of the 
fundamental pattern of the MPX sequence.   This structural transformation is related to 
the concept of “the ladder of economic development,” which is popularly used—but 
without any clear-cut definition-- in development economics.  This concept will be 
therefore elaborated on below within the FG framework. 
 
2.3. An Alignment of Countries at Different Stages of Development  
A third FG pattern is “the alignment of nations along the different stages of development” 
(Akamatsu, 1961, p. 208), a sequential positioning of the developing countries that are 
lined up behind the advanced nations so that the former can emulate, learn from, and 
capitalize on growth stimuli/externalities via economic interactions.   As Akamatsu put it, 
“It is impossible to study the economic growth of the developing countries in modern 
times without considering the mutual interactions between these economies and those of 
the advanced countries” (1962, p. 1, emphasis added).  In other words, the modern 
process of economic development can never be autonomous and self-sufficient but is 
necessarily interactive with—and derived from-- more advanced countries. 
     The essence of growth lies in a process of climbing the ladder of comparative 
advantages from labor-intensive to gradually and increasingly more capital-and 
knowledge-intensive industries on the part of catching-up countries (the ladder to be 
defined below).  And all this would be achieved through dynamic commercial interplays 
                                                 
2 How Akamatsu’s MPX sequence is related to other Western development theories is discussed in Ozawa 
(2009).  
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between advanced countries and developing ones.  The countries across the world are at 
different stages of development, growing at different speeds of structural transformation.  
This constitutes a basis for dynamic comparative advantages, and the countries within a 
hierarchy of countries can interact with each other in a complementary and mutually 
augmenting way so that they can benefit from the “economies of hierarchical 
concatenation” (Ozawa, 2001).  Such economies are analogous to the effect that a gaggle 
of 25 flying geese can achieve a “70 percent-range energy saving over a bird flying solo” 
thanks to the “wingtip vortex” and “upwash/upcurrent” mutually created by flying 
together (Gedney, 1982).   It is also observed in econometric studies on national 
economic growth that “regional dummies add substantially to a growth regression’s 
explanatory power” (Temple, 1999, p. 131). 
     It is this third pattern that has become most popularized and widely accepted among 
those scholars and journalists who make reference to the FG theory of economic 
development.  The typical pattern cited is usually the FG formation of East Asian 
economies, a formation led by Japan and immediately followed by the NIEs and then by 
the ASEAN-4, and more recently by China, and Vietnam--all down the hierarchy of 
economies that are at different and staggered stages of economic development.  As will 
be made clear later on, however, this Japan-led intra-regional alignment of follower geese 
is somewhat a misleading representation of the FG phenomenon.  The first lead goose has 
never been Japan but the United States. 
     As some critiques of the FG theory point out, furthermore, an intra-East Asian 
alignment of Japan-> the NIEs-> the ASEAN-4-> China-> Vietnam, if ever existed, is no 
longer observable.   True, there was at one time a perfect multi-layered alignment of 
countries (U.S.-> Japan-> the NIEs-> the ASEAN-4-> China)--mostly throughout the 
1960s, the 1970, and the 1980s.  Such a linear and monotonic lineup has been disturbed 
as latecomers caught up rapidly.  For example, the NIEs, especially South Korea and 
Taiwan, have caught up with Japan in some heavy industries (e.g., steel) and in some 
high-tech sectors (e.g., electronics and telecommunications).  China’s swift rise as a new 
workshop of the world has left the ASEAN-4 in the dust.  Japan has clearly overtaken the 
United States in automobile manufacturing.  There is thus no streamlined alignment any 
more.  In fact, stages of catch-up are jumbled, time-compressed, and even reversed, 
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depending on a catch-up strategy adopted by a developing country (Ozawa, 2009).  
Nevertheless, despite the financial debacle of 2008, the role of the United States as the 
lead goose (the hegemon of the world economy) still prevails and will remain intact for 
the foreseeable future.  And in this sense, the FG theory is still quite relevant.         
 
3.  Radelet and Sachs’ Interpretations 
It is in reference to the third FG pattern that Radelet and Sachs (1997) recognize and 
interpret the FG theory as a major doctrine of development strategy: 
   … the “flying geese” model, according to which countries gradually move up 
in technological development by following in the pattern of countries just ahead 
of them in the development process.  In this vision, Korea and Taiwan take over 
leadership in textiles and apparel from Japan as Japan moves into the higher-
technology sectors of electronics, transport, and other capital goods.  A decade 
or so later, Korea and Taiwan are able to upgrade to electronics and auto 
components, while the textile and apparel industries move to Indonesia, 
Thailand, and Vietnam... (p. 52). 
 
      Although the United States as the lead goose is not specifically mentioned, the FG 
model is clearly defined above as a process of sequential catch-up in technological 
progress, one country following on the heels of more advanced countries on the ladder of 
technological development (i.e., Akamatsu’s third FG pattern).  This may also be called 
“tandem growth” or “U.S.-led growth clustering” (Ozawa, 2009). 
       What are, then, the necessary institutional setups for a developing country to move 
up in technological development?   Radelet and Sachs explain the distinct institutional 
arrangements that were each specific to the three major doctrines of development 
strategy:  
     If the paradigmatic institution of the big push was state ownership of industry 
[as exemplified by the Stalinist drive toward rapid industrialization in the 1930s 
and China’s Great Leap Forward of 1958-61], and for import substitution was 
private ownership backed by protectionism [as once seen throughout Latin 
America’s inward-focused development strategy], for flying-geese development 
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it is the export platform.  The idea behind an export platform is to create an 
enclave economy hospitable to foreign investors and integrated into the global 
economy, without the problems of infrastructure, security, rule of law, and trade 
policies that plague the rest of the economy.  Asian governments introduced 
several variations of the export platform, including export processing zones 
(EPZs), bonded warehouses, special economic zones, and duty drawback 
systems.  Governments supported these institutions with macroeconomic 
policies that strengthened the incentives for labor-intensive exports, especially 
via appropriate exchange rates (emphasis added, pp. 52-53). 
 
     The “big push” approach was thus pursued in the interest of nationalistic self-reliance 
under communism and in isolation from the outside world.  The “import-substitution” 
strategy, too, was carried out in an inward-focused fashion without much integration with 
the global economy.   Both doctrines proved to be failures.   In sharp contrast, the FG 
doctrine promotes integration with, and capitalization on, the outside world, by setting up 
what Radelet and Sachs call “capitalist enclaves” (p. 45) that serve as the bootstraps of 
catch-up development. 
      The enclaves, notably export processing zones (EPZs) and special economic zones 
(SEZs), constitute the localized pockets of market capitalism, free from and 
unencumbered by regulatory controls and political/bureaucratic constraints that prevail in 
the rest of the country—so as to be integrated into the global economy that is currently 
molded and driven by U.S.-led capitalism.  They are, therefore, attractive to foreign 
multinational corporations who can bring in all the necessary productive resources (such 
as technology, managerial skills, capital goods, and access to export markets) lacking at 
home.  The enclaves are an institutional innovation that is pragmatically designed to 
introduce thorough reforms (“wiping the slate clean,” so to speak) only in certain 
confined localities if such reforms are impractical for the whole economy.3  Entire 
                                                 
3  Radelet and Sachs (1997) zero in on this point: “If there is anything to the “Asian miracle,” it is that 
several governments, benefiting from Japan’s early experience and from each other’s experience since the 
1960s, have been able to create an economic environment for profitable, private investment—almost 
always with important foreign partners—despite serious shortcomings in overall political and economic 
conditions.  They did so, in most cases, by creating in the midst of weaker economic institutions a capitalist 
enclave that has gradually spread throughout the economy.  Put another way, Asia’s challenge, so far 
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institutions cannot be changed overnight, but they can be partially modified by creating 
enclaves.4 
    In short, Radelet and Sachs’ interpretation emphasizes the establishment of “capitalist 
enclaves” as a starting point for market reforms and integration with the world economy 
so as to capitalize on global capitalism that “stirs powerful forces for economic growth” 
(1997, p. 46).  It, however, leaves unexplained the causal factors for technological 
upgrading and the sequence of technological development. 
 
4.  The ladder of Economic (or Technological) Development: Defined  
 
4.1. Trail-blazers’ Legacy 
What drives structural upgrading from one stage to another—that is, Akamatsu’s 
progression “from crude and simple goods to complex and refined goods” and “capital 
goods following consumer goods” or Radelet and Sacks’ sequence of “moving up in 
technological development”?   In other words, what factors propel a catching-up 
economy to scale the ladder of economic/technological development—and in what 
manner?  To answer this question, however, we must first define the ladder of economic 
development itself. 
     In neoclassical economics, economic development is conceived as a process of capital 
accumulation, that is to say, a country’s capital-to-labor ratio increases.  This merely 
means, however, that any growing country becomes increasingly more capital-abundant 
as the national income rises.   Yet, capital accumulation is rather an effect or result and 
not the cause of growth.   What really brings about spurts of growth and structural change 
under capitalism is innovations, both technological and organizational, or breakthrough 
                                                                                                                                                 
accomplished, has been to create a virtuous circle, in which a modern economic sector originally confined 
to an enclave has not only expanded through new investments but has fueled a much broader 
modernization of political and economic institutions…global capitalism stirs powerful forces for economic 
growth even in the face of serious limitations in law, economic structure, and politics” (pp. 45-46). 
4 It is interesting to note that the idea of “a modern economic sector originally confined to an enclave” is 
now clearly promoted and applied by Sachs to UN-initiated economic development projects in Africa.  As 
part of the UN Millennium Project on poverty reduction Sachs has initially set up 12 “research villages” in 
ten African countries and soon added another 66 villages.  These villages are designed as the “modern 
sectors” that are provide with “fertilizer and seed to improve food yield; anti-malarial bed nets; improved 
water sources; diversification from staple into cash crops; a school feeding programme; deworming for all; 
and the introduction of new technologies, such as energy-saving stoves and mobile phones” (“African 
poverty: The magnificent seven,” The Economist, April 29, 2006, pp. 51-52). 
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technological progress that creates brand-new industries that replace existing ones, as 
stressed by Joseph Schumpeter (1934). 
     Therefore, the ladder of economic development can be defined by tracing out the 
actual historical path of industrial (hence technological) development driven by 
innovations.  The model to be presented here may be called a “leading-sector stages 
model” a la Schumpeter, in which a sequence of growth is punctuated by stages (five 
stages so far, as will be seen below), and in each stage a certain industrial sector can be 
identified as the main engine of structural transformation (Ozawa, 2005).   In other 
words, long-term growth is not input-driven incrementally and marginally—not “due to a 
quasi-automatic increase in population [labor] and capital” (Schumpeter, 1942, p. 82)—
but is set in motion by innovations, which then eventually lead to rapid capital formation 
in innovation-initiated new industries that serve as leading sectors.  A set of innovations 
creates a new rung for the ladder of economic development.  In sum, the dynamic 
capitalist process of growth can be neither incrementally additive nor smoothly 
cumulative in capital accumulation as posited by neoclassical economics, but is driven by 
the logic of “creative destruction” that brings about “structural breaks.”  
     More specifically, this leading-sector stages model is built on the historical evidence 
that the world economy has so far witnessed five tiers of leading growth industry emerge 
in wave-like progression ever since the Industrial Revolution in England.  The five 
rungs/tiers are schematically illustrated in Figure 1.  These tiers give some defining 
characteristics to the erstwhile nebulous notion of a “ladder of economic development.” 
 
***INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE*** 
 
     The first dominant industry that appeared was what may be called “Heckscher-Ohlin” 
endowments-driven (natural resources- or “raw” labor-intensive light) industries best 
represented by cotton textiles.  (The first stage is named after the Heckscher-Ohlin trade 
theory that explains the doctrine of comparative advantage in terms of different factor 
proportions between countries and different factor intensities between goods.)   It was 
soon followed by the “non-differentiated Smithian” scale-driven (physical capital-
intensive, natural resource-processing) heavy and chemical industries, such as steel and 
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basic chemicals (mostly homogeneous/nondifferentiated goods).  This second stage is 
named after Adam Smith who stressed the gains from dynamic increasing returns 
(inclusive of knowledge accumulation) in production. 
     Indeed, the Golden Age of Capitalism, Mark I (1780-1914) stemmed from the rapid 
growth of these first two phases of technological/industrial development under Great 
Britain’s hegemony.  That Age’s need—and its search—for natural resources (e.g., iron 
and copper ores) and overseas markets for textiles and capital goods led to colonialism.  
And scale-driven heavy and chemical industrialization was pursued relentlessly under 
imperialism as part and parcel of an arms race among the imperial powers. 
     The rise of the U.S. as the industrial hegemon after World War II originated from 
American ingenuity in the innovation of interchangeable parts and assembly-line 
operations, which eventually culminated in the American manufacturing paradigm of 
mass production on the supply side and the America-initiated pattern of mass 
consumption on the demand side that both would set the tone for the rest of the world.  
The “differentiated Smithian” assembly-based industries (notably automobiles) emerged 
at the leading growth sector in the United States, following the introduction of Ford’s 
assembly-lines and Frederick Taylor’s scientific management (“time and motion study”).  
Fordism-cum-Taylorism thus became the dominant manufacturing paradigm, which was 
aimed at exploiting increasing returns to scale through standardization of products (as 
initially exemplified by the Model T), work processes, and parts and components.  With 
entry of many competing producers, however, automobiles became increasingly 
differentiated in engineering, designs, functions, optional features, and add-on 
accessories to satisfy consumers’ diversified preferences. 
     The stage of assembly-based industries, which also include electric machinery and 
appliances, is by nature far more consumer-oriented and far more responsive to 
diversified consumer tastes than its previous counterpart of heavy and chemical 
industrialization.  The growth of these consumer-focused industries necessitated—and is 
compatible with--strong market democracy where people are able to vote by their dollars 
in determining the desirable types of consumer goods.  Individual freedom of choice 
became the sine qua none of the age of high mass consumption.  Consumerism is the 
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market ideology of U.S.-led global capitalism—and the hallmark of the Golden Age of 
Capitalism, Mark II (1950-71).   
     Rising consumerism in turn spurred R&D activities in corporate America in search of 
new products.  As a consequence, especially in the post-WWII period, the Schumpeterian 
R&D-driven industries came to represent the subsequent stage of economic growth.  The 
outcome was early postwar innovations of knowledge-intensive consumer goods, such as 
TV sets, computers, semiconductors, washers and dryers, dishwashers, microwave ovens, 
tape-recorders, and antibiotics.  In the 1950s and 1960s, many large corporations in 
science-based industries began to set up R&D centers.  Notable were IBM’s Watson Labs 
and AT&T’s Bell Labs.  The “age of corporate laboratories” (Best, 2000) was thus 
ushered into the U.S. economy, leading to America’s technological leadership in many 
emerging high-tech sectors.  “Created assets” began increasingly to substitute for and 
replace “endowed” natural assets.  Indeed, this structural transformation of the U.S. 
economy was captured in the product-cycle (PC) theory of trade and investment (Vernon, 
1966: Hirsch, 1967). 
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     The latest stage of economic growth is driven by information technology (IT).  It has 
emanated from the configuration of Schumpeterian industries.  The new stage is built on 
the Internet and other forms of IT, which have revolutionalized the way we communicate 
with each other and gather information.  The IT-based stage can be most appropriately 
called the “McLuhan” Internet-enabled phase of growth, in which we now live—named 
after Marshall McLuhan, the guru of mass communications.  Indeed, the phenomena of 
“The Medium is the Message” (McLuhan and Fiore, 1967) and “The Global Village” 
(now Web-enabled) (McLuhan and Powers, 1989) are the hallmarks of our present age of 
information.  This new growth sector was pioneered in the U.S., particularly during the 
first tech-boom of the latter half of the 1990s.  The New Economy thus has come into 
existence.  Moreover, the newest two sub-phases of R&D-driven growth are already in 
the making as additional spin-offs from the Schumpeterian industries and as subsystems 
of the New Economy.  One is based on the biotechnology (BT) revolution, and the 
second is the nanotechnology (NT) revolution.   In fact, these three revolutions of IT, BT, 
and NT are fast converging. 
     We can recapitulate the sequential path and nature of modern industries introduced 
under Anglo-American global capitalism as follows:  What the Pax Britannica introduced 
were initially the labor-intensive light industries (of the “Heckscher-Ohlin” type) as 
typified by textiles and then the resource-intensive, scale-driven heavy and chemical 
industries (of the “non-differentiated Smithian” type) as epitomized by steel, basic 
chemicals, and heavy machinery.5  These stages represent the Old Economy.  They were 
once developed and thrived as the leading growth sectors in the advanced countries in the 
pre-WWII period—under a variety of economic systems; unfettered bourgeois capitalism 
and colonialism (early on in Great Britain and other capitalist powers), communism (in 
the Soviet Union and China), fascism (in Germany, Italy, and Japan), and 
welfare/socialist capitalism (in Scandinavia). 
     In contrast, the Pax Americana created the highly components-intensive, assembly-
based, genuinely consumer-oriented, and R&D-intensive industries (the “differentiated 
Smithian” and “Schumpeterian” stages) as best represented by mass-produced 
                                                 
5 These resource-intensive industries in turn created voracious demands for minerals and fossil fuels, 
thereby getting resource-rich developing countries involved as supply sources. 
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automobiles and electronics.  And most recently, the Internet-enabled information-
intensive industries (the “McLuhan” stage).  In particular, the IT-driven industries are 
built on “intellectual and entrepreneurial capital” and strongly geared to, and closely tied 
with, the needs of final consumers in product development, distribution, and 
consumption.  The New Economy is the latest creation of U.S.-led capitalism.6 
 
4.2. Intra-industry Vertical Fragmentation 
In addition to the basic five-stages of structural upgrading described above, each 
advanced stage has produced a widening range of vertically concatenated (hence, 
fragmentable) multi-process industries (or multi-segments), the upper end of which is 
highly capital-intensive and technologically sophisticated, while the lower end is labor-
intensive and technologically standardized—hence, the latter being more readily 
transferable to low-wage developing countries (see Figure 2).   As a consequence, even 
higher-stage industries, especially automobiles, electronics, and telecommunications 
equipment, are transplanting their low-end production (mostly of standardized 
parts/components/accessories, as well as the low value-added, low-profit lines of finished 
goods) onto low-wage locations in the developing world.  The same thing can be said 
about services such as back-office jobs, as seen in the growth of call centers and data 
processing in the developing countries, most notably India.  In short, both industrial 
upgrading (of the inter-industry/stage type) and refined vertical chains of value-added (of 
the intra-industry/stage type) have created opportunities structurally for the firms in both 
the advanced and the developing countries to pursue a new division of labor within a 
                                                 
6 As Baumol (2002) argues, free market capitalism is the most efficient “innovation machine” to produce a 
stream of innovations, satisfying consumer needs and demands because of its “survival of the fittest” force 
of fierce competition.  The rise of consumerism explains at least in part why Soviet communism came 
tumbling down in the late 1980s and why China began to switch to a market economy by opening its doors 
about the same time.   
     Market capitalism is therefore the necessary institution for Pax-Americana-nurtured industries, 
especially for the New Economy, where individuals are increasingly empowered more fully to exercise 
freedom of choice and communicate with each other at the grass roots more freely than ever before in real-
time exchange of information at the click of a mouse, thanks to the IT revolution.  (No wonder, then, why 
the Chinese government is having difficulty controlling the public in the use of the Internet for the purpose 
of criticizing the Communist party and expressing democratic values.)  
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network of production across borders—that is, cross-border value chains are thus 
established.7  
 
***INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE*** 
 
4.3. What Comes Next on the Ladder?  The “Green Technology (GT)” Revolution? 
It is important to also emphasize that the source of main energy shifted from coal under 
Pax Britannica to oil under Pax Americana.  And the rise of assembly-based industries 
(especially automobiles) for mass consumption inevitably increased demand for oil as 
both fuel and raw materials (for synthetics such as plastics).  The U.S. and all other 
advanced countries are now “addicted to” oil.8  And the recently surging demand for oil 
in China and India, as they enter the oil-dependent stage, is further contributing to the 
soaring demand for oil.  Indeed, this heavy oil dependence may prove to be the Achilles’ 
heel of U.S.-led capitalism unless alternative sources of energy are harnessed to replace 
oil.  
     Besides oil, furthermore, the current mode of industrialization and consumption has 
whipped up voracious appetites for other natural resources, such as copper, iron ore, and 
special metals.   And the extraction of these resources is accompanied by ecological 
destruction and environmental problems.  Moreover, the contemporary modality of 
consumption is highly energy-intensive and pollution-causing, especially in the use of 
automobiles, home/office heating and cooling, and household appliances.  
      Consequently, alternative sources of energy (such as solar energy, wind power, 
ocean-currents, geothermal energy, and biofuels) have been developed and increasingly 
tapped.  Green technology (GT) for products and services, as well as for production, is a 
new catch phrase across the world.   A GT-driven stage of growth as the next rung is in 
its infancy where BT, IT, and NT would separately spark or combine to ignite GT 
innovations—for instance, BT in biofuels, IT in smart energy meters and grids, and NT in 
energy consumption efficiency.   
 
                                                 
7 For an excellent study on cross-border commodity value chains, see ,inter alia, Gereffi (1999).  
8 The Pax Americana is characterized by the car culture.  One billion cars are expected to be on the road 
worldwide by 2020.  “Automotive: the Journal Report,” Wall Street Journal, April 17, 2006, R1. 
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4. 2. Latecomers’ Paths to Catch-up Growth 
What has been described above is the evolutionary unfolding of industrial structure as a 
series of innovations introduced one leading sector after another for over two centuries in 
the presently advanced world.  The stages progression toward higher value-added 
industries (measured on the vertical axis in Figures 1 and 2) and the time involved 
(measured on the horizontal axis) necessarily indicate a monotonic progression from a 
longitudinal historical perspective.  Yet, for today’s catching-up countries, the 
progression can be modified, its order sidetracked, and its pattern made non-monotonic.  
After all, the historical path described presents only a flight map, so to speak, that 
follower-geese countries can consult in order to plan their own catch-up strategies.  In 
other words, they are in a position to design their own paths by taking shortcuts whenever 
and wherever possible. 
     These possibilities are made all the more available, since in addition to the inter-
industry progression toward higher value-added industries, there has occurred the intra-
industry vertical deepening and fragmentation of each industry, with high-skill, capital-
intensive production at the top and low-skill, labor-intensive production at the bottom 
(Figure 2).  This development is creating trade opportunities for a new division of labor 
in which advanced and developing countries can further participate along the logic of the 
Heckscher-Ohlin theory—that is, for the advanced countries to specialize in the higher 
end markets, and for the developing countries in the lower-end markets (at least, initially 
as the first step in joining the global economy).  This increased opportunity for the 
vertical division of labor is made possible in part because of the rise of components/parts-
intensive industries (such as automobiles and electronics) and in part because of the IT 
revolution that has considerably reduced transactions costs.  Some developing countries 
are now able to initiate their catch-up growth from the services sector and then move 
toward the manufacturing sector, as is the case with the recent strategy adopted by India.   
And this widened window of business opportunity is being actively partaken by 
multinational corporations in terms of a variety of their international business activity.       
                                          
5. Enabling Mechanisms of Sequential Growth and Upgrading 
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5.1.  Wages and Flexible Labor Markets  
The advanced countries no longer have comparative advantages in lower-tier industries, 
especially labor-intensive light manufacturing (e.g., textiles and apparel) and resource-
based “smoke-stack” low-tech heavy and chemical industries (e.g., steel and basic 
chemicals).  Ironically, their own technological progress—hence their successful 
structural ratcheting-up—has made it impractical and impossible for them to retain 
competitiveness in lower-tier industries—and for that matter in the low-end segments of 
each of higher-tier industries (e.g., standardized final, intermediate, and capital goods). 
This loss of competitiveness is necessarily the inevitable outcome of “creative 
destruction” in the world of dynamic comparative advantages. 
     Such a structural transformation in the advanced world means that low-wage-based 
light industries (notably textiles and apparel) and assembly-operations of higher-tier 
industries (e.g., assembly of electronics goods such as TV sets and cell phones) are the 
ideal “entry” industries for developing countries to start out with in their efforts to climb 
the ladder of economic development.  These industries, indeed, can serve as jump-starters 
of development by mobilizing the developing countries’ most abundant factor, unskilled 
or semi-skilled labor, to active employment—hence, the most effective market-
coordinated way of reducing poverty.9   Being cognizant of this fact, many developing 
countries are eagerly producing and exporting apparel and standardized electronics goods 
as their major manufactures.  Interestingly enough, this development strategy usually puts 
female workers, especially from the poor rural areas, in great demand, since low-end 
manufacturing creates more jobs for young female workers than for their male 
counterparts for whatever reasons.10   
     What really matters here is not so much low wages per se but flexible labor markets, 
in the sense that market principles are at work in wage determination and employment.  
In this respect, the setting-up of enclaves is no doubt the necessary first step in the 
developing countries if they are to capitalize on global capitalism.  East Asia as a 
                                                 
9 This mechanism is stressed in the model of “comparative advantage recycling in labor-driven growth” 
(Ozawa, 2009, Chap. 4).  
10 It is an important—often politically and emotionally charged—issue whether female workers are made 
better off or simply exploited as many feminists contend.  It is, however, beyond the scope of this paper, 
since it requires careful analysis and justifies no generalization, as all depends on specific situations and 
circumstances.  For a balanced analysis, however, see Bhagwati (2004). 
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whole—but especially China despite its communist rule—has fortuitously benefited from 
flexible labor markets largely because of the establishment and spread of capitalist 
enclaves.  By comparison, India is still experiencing some difficulty fostering labor-
intensive manufacturing because of strong labor unions and socialist labor laws despite 
the fact that it has already set up more than a dozen special economic zones modeled after 
China’s.11  Thus, enclaves alone are not a sufficient condition unless they are relieved 
from labor market rigidities.  
     Critics of labor-driven industrialization charge that it is a dead end, entrapping a 
developing country in perpetual labor exploitation by foreign interests.12  The reality is, 
however, quite contrary.  It opens up a way to higher wages and higher value-added 
activities.  The Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory provides two major reasons: (i) when a 
developing country concentrates on labor-intensive production, the demand for the 
country’s most abundant factor, namely labor, rises more than for their scarce factor, 
capital; and (ii) the factor-price (wage) magnification effect occurs in which the wage 
increases more than proportionately than the price of exports the labor produces.   In fact, 
wages increased rapidly as Asian countries went through the labor-driven stage of catch-
up growth.  This phenomenon also leads to the rise of the middle-income group, which in 
turn expands domestic markets, soon supplementing export markets—all this creating a 
virtuous circle of economic expansion.   
     Flexibility in the labor market also means that once low-wage industries become 
comparatively disadvantaged, they are willingly contracted and shifted to still lower-
wage countries abroad.  This type of industrial transmigration occurred first from Japan 
to the NIEs, then from the NIEs to the ASEAN-4, and more recently to China—and lately 
to Vietnam and Cambodia.  This relatively smooth transplantation has been made 
possible because the comparatively disadvantaged (hence, contracting) industries are on 
the whole (i) free from labor market rigidities (e.g., layoff restrictions) and are (ii) not 
rescued and sustained by inflows of low-skill labor from abroad, hence they can no 
longer be retained at home.   The upshot was that resources were readily reallocated to 
                                                 
11 “India, Known for Outsourcing, Expands in Industry,” New York Times (on the Web), May 19, 2006. 
12 Many incidences of labor abuse no doubt occur unless the minimum work and safety standards are 
effectively enforced by the host governments.  Here, NGOs and the codes of conduct by multinationals are 
helpful in reducing the abuse of workers.   
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higher value-added (hence higher wage) activities, and labor-saving innovations were 
encouraged and introduced.  (The economic consequence of this structural change is 
perhaps most succinctly summarized in a once-oft-quoted observation: “While Japan is 
getting robots, Germany is getting Turks.”13)  
     A rapid rate of structural upgrading in more advanced countries, combined with the 
flexible labor markets on the part of catching-up countries, facilitates a transmigration of 
labor-intensive manufacturing, flying-geese style, from a higher developing country to 
lower developing countries across Asia.  This provides one major explanation of why 
Third-World multinationals come into existence in the relatively early phase of their 
home countries’ industrialization (Ozawa, 1992). 
     The labor-driven phase of growth is thus usually accommodated by flexible labor 
markets largely because labor-intensive industries (such as apparel) are highly 
competitive with a large number of small (family-owned) and medium firms (often 
forming a putting-out system) dominating such industries—and because of an abundance 
of unskilled or semi-skilled workers.  Labor unions are scarcely existent.  Yet, as a 
catching-up country moves up to the higher stages of growth where more capital 
investment is required for a much larger scale of operation and better-educated and 
skilled labor is needed, government involvement increases as a provider of capital and 
skill-training—and even as an initiator of new factories (say, steel mills).  This new 
industrial environment is often amenable to labor unionism, reducing flexibility for 
further industrial upgrading, if industrial unions are organized.14     
 
5.2.  Currency Valuation 
It has been found that developing countries’ currencies tend to remain undervalued 
relative to advanced countries’ (Bhagwati, 1984; Kravis and Lipsey, 1983).  In fact, most 
developing countries want to keep their currencies undervalued, if possible, to gain 
export competitiveness and protect domestic industries.  An undervalued home currency 
is thus normally a plus factor in export-led growth.  Yet, the very success of such a 
                                                 
13 This saying was reportedly popular when Germany’s postwar economic miracle introduced the 
Gastarbeiter program (“Economic focus: Be my guest,” Economist, Oct. 8, 2005, p. 86). 
14 In this regard, Japan benefited from the prevalence of company unions whose interests (higher wages and 
job security) are closely tied with their own companies’ performance, facilitating diversifications into new 
businesses. 
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currency strategy ironically and inevitably leads to home currency appreciation as its 
trade balance improves.  If the exchange rate is nominally fixed, the currency becomes 
even more undervalued—i.e., real exchange rate depreciation.  This may strain trade 
relationships with other countries and eventually cause increasingly high domestic prices 
of imported capital goods and industrial materials.  In other words, the benefits of 
undervalued currency begin to be outweighed by the costs during the course of rapid 
catch-up growth. 
     Some argue that the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates has been revived 
in Asia, where exchange rate fluctuations against the dollar are contained by the Asian 
governments’ foreign exchange market interventions (Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and 
Garber, 2003)—and that such stabilized exchange rates may be even a desideratum for 
catch-up growth and should not be disturbed by rate adjustment (McKinnon, 2005a; 
2005b—in defense of China’s present currency policy).  Undervalued currencies are thus 
considered one key explanatory variable in Asia’ phenomenal catch-up growth.   It has 
come to be described even as a new paradigm for Asia’s development.  
     Paradoxically, however, any undervalued currency eventually meets the fate of sharp 
appreciation in the course of export-driven industrialization.  For example, in the wake of 
Japan’s swift catch-up growth with its current-account surplus rising, the Japanese yen 
became grossly undervalued.  Consequently, as soon as after the fixed exchange rates 
were abandoned in 1973, the yen began to soar in value and became even overvalued.   
The yen gained more than fourfold in value against the dollar in 1995.  As a consequence, 
many Japanese firms shifted production out of Japan into neighboring countries--not so 
much because they lost real comparative advantages, but rather because the abnormally 
high yen made it disproportionately more costly to produce at home than abroad (Ozawa, 
2005). 
     Although less dramatic, a similar exchange-rate effect has been observed in the NIEs’ 
overseas investments in the ASEAN-4 and China.  In 1985, the NIEs’ currencies likewise 
began to exhibit a secular trend of appreciation.  In the meanwhile, the ASEAN-4’s 
currencies and China’s yuan in particular became undervalued.  Indeed, because of 
China’s rapid catch-up growth, the yuan is now grossly undervalued and under pressure 
for appreciation.  These changing trends in exchange rates have no doubt played a key 
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role in the rapid transmigration of labor-intensive production, first from Japan to the NIEs 
and then from the NIEs to the ASEAN-4 and China.15  The potential and inevitable 
appreciation of the yuan has already been compelling multinational, as well as Chinese, 
firms to adopt a “China-plus-one” strategy to move production out of China to Vietnam, 
Cambodia, and other still low-cost locations.    
 
5.3.  Market-Enhancing Structural Policy—and Trade and Multinationals as  
  Market Coordinators 
 
5.3.1. Coordination failure 
Special economic zones like EPZs are an effective instrument to attract foreign 
multinationals’ investment and offshored production in the labor-driven phase of catch-
up growth.  They are, however, no longer useful for higher stages of growth that require 
far larger amounts of capital investment both in infrastructure and in production facilities, 
more intensive uses of human skills, and cutting-edge technologies.   After all, what 
matters at higher levels of growth is created assets, and no longer so much endowed 
assets at home.  And both supply and demand complementarities (as external economies) 
rise pari passu with structural transformation (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943). 
     After all, modern industries (e.g., steel, heavy machinery, chemicals, and automobiles) 
are characterized by (i) large-scale operations (large minimum efficient scales) that can 
reap the benefits of increasing returns, (ii) vertical (intra-process) and horizontal (multi-
variety goods) specializations, and (iii) the need for a high degree of coordination in 
matching input supplies and in creating and meeting the demand conditions (Balassa, 
1980).  Coordination failures, especially in investment activities, are expected as a 
developing country strives to move up the ladder of development (Rodrik, 1995--for the 
cases of South Korea and Taiwan; Okazaki, 1997-- in reference to Japan).  Therefore, 
there exists a legitimate justification for government involvement.  This is actually 
nothing new; Alexander Gerschenrkon (1962) earlier observed that developing countries 
as latecomers to industrialization tend to rely on institutional arrangements (notably 
                                                 
15 Although the undervaluation is not emphasized, Kwan (1994) observes how the changes over time in the 
exchange rates of East Asian currencies contributed to transmigration of production in a FG fashion across 
the region. 
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direct state involvement) rather than on the market—for the very simple reason that the 
market mechanism has yet to be developed.    
     In order to climb up the higher rungs of the development ladder, individual firms or 
entrepreneurs themselves may be neither willing nor capable to take investment risks in 
new modern industries unless they are assisted financially by their government.  In other 
words, industrial or structural policy, along with special public funding for infrastructure 
in particular, is called for.  In the words of Wade (2010) “leading the market” is far 
riskier than “following the market,” and a government may take on the task of “leading 
the market” in terms of industrial policy.  Therefore, government involvement necessarily 
entails (as already mentioned above in Section 5.1).  This is especially the case when a 
developing country strives to catch up in industrialization as a matter of national goal.  It 
is for these reasons that the “big push” doctrine of catch-up development was once 
advocated in order to take care of the simultaneous coordination of supply and demand 
requirements—that is, to solve the rampant problem of coordination failures.16 
 
5.3.2. Trade and multinationals as market coordinators 
In addition, developing countries face a supply gap in vital industrial inputs when 
manufacturing activities begin to take root, requiring new intermediate goods which are 
not yet readily available at home.  In this regard, it should be stressed that trade and 
multinational corporations’ investment activities serve the role of market coordinators in 
filling the gaps in supply and demand conditions for intermediate goods.  Neoclassical 
trade theory predicts two gains: “exchange gains” and “specialization gains.”  
“coordination gains,” however, need to be added in the dynamic context of structural 
upgrading in an outward-focused developing country. 
     In fact, export-led growth in all the East Asian follower geese has become dependent 
on imported parts, components, and accessories from the advanced countries, especially 
from Japan.  “In 1987, [the NIEs] obtained from Japan almost 50% of their total imports 
of technology-intensive manufactures (up from about 41% in 1980 as compared to 26% 
                                                 
16     The Japanese experience can illustrate the point.  It is no wonder the keiretsu groups (which were 
instrumental in solving the problem of coordination failure), the main-bank system (which created ample 
credit for capital-intensive industries), and the state-run long-term banks (devoted to invest in 
infrastructure) were once all arranged to facilitate the reconstruction and modernization of Japan’s war-torn 
heavy and chemical industries in the early postwar period.   For a detailed analysis, see Ozawa (2005). 
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from the United States)” (Park and Park, 1991).  Shinohara (1987) noted that Japan 
interacts with the rest of East Asia more strongly from the supply side (i.e., as a supplier 
of inputs) than from the demand side (i.e., as a buyer of finished manufactures).  China’s 
successful exports to the “G3” of America, Europe and Japan likewise involve “re-
exports” as China imports components and assemble them into finished export goods.  
Some 60 percent of Malaysian exports to China are re-exported. “Made in China” thus 
often means “assembled in China.”17   
     It is therefore correct to argue that the East Asian countries are not simply export-
driven but at the same time strategically import-driven.  Imports of industrial knowledge, 
capital goods, and intermediate supplies, notably through multinationals’ operations, are 
critical for the success of export-led growth.  Indeed, an “import- and export-led growth” 
paradigm (Klein, 1990; Dutta, 1999) is appropriate for East Asia—excepting Japan that 
developed a rather self-sufficient industrial structure under infant-industry protection and 
without much reliance on imported capital goods. 
     And this modality of “import- and export-led growth” constitutes the basis of 
triangular or circular trade among three parties: Japan—and now the NIEs—as suppliers 
of capital and intermediate goods to China, which basically does assembling operations 
and exports finished goods to the G3 (notably, U.S. and Europe that both provide the 
major markets to China.  And most recently, the intra-Asian segment of this circular trade 
has expanded, along with the China-U.S. segment, giving an erroneous impression that a 
rise in intra-Asian trade makes the region more autonomous in growth and independent 
of the U.S. and Europe.  But the truth is that China’s growth is still export-driven with the 
advanced countries’ markets as the major outlet for its manufactures, despite its 
premature triumphalism as evidenced in what China calls the “golden age of 
development” in Asia18   
 
5.3.3. The market as a good servant  
According to the World Bank (1993), the high-performing Asian Economies (HPAEs) 
got the fundamentals right by way of (i) carefully limited and “market-friendly” 
                                                 
17 “Banyan: Afloat on a Chinese tide,” Economist, Sep. 4, 2010, p. 48. 
18 This phrase was reportedly used in China’s People’s Daily.  See Ibid., p. 48.   
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government activism, (ii) strong export orientation, (iii) high levels of domestic savings, 
(iv) accumulation of human and physical capital, (v) good macro-economic management, 
(vi) acquisition of advanced foreign technology, (vii) flexible labor markets, and (viii) 
“shared growth” (in which the benefits of growth spread to all groups).  All these features 
are pro-business in nature.  Indeed, policy matters—in building market-compatible (if not 
totally market-dictated) economies.  There is an abundance of literature on the key role of 
government as a market-facilitating or market-enhancing agent in East Asian growth 
(inter alia, Amsden 1989, 2002; Aoki, Muredock and Okuno-Fujiwara, 1997; Wade, 
1990), hence no need here to detail it.  Here it suffices to say that East Asia’s “social 
capacity”--a term coined by Ohkawa and Rosovsky (1972) and popularized by 
Abramovitz (1986)--are neither innate nor manna from Heaven but have been created and 
governed by the governments.  This pro-activist approach is in sharp contrast to the 
neoclassical stance to place full trust in the market mechanism, which was at one time 
reflected in the so-called “Washington Consensus.”   
     In this respect, Stiglitz (2003) advocates a “new (i.e., post-Washington Consensus) 
paradigm of development.”  This constitutes a “more holistic approach to development,” 
whose features “were in fact, incorporated in the development strategies of the fastest 
[Asian] developers” (Stiglitz, 2003, p.92).  In other words, the new paradigm is built on, 
and modeled after, the successful growth of East Asia’s economies.  After all, East Asian 
miracle has been characterized by the effective management of the market at the hands of 
“developmental states” (a term coined by Johnson, 1982) that actively engage in 
industrial policy to foster structural transformation.  How the role of government was 
played in “governing the market” and engendering catch-up growth in East Asia is 
explored in Wade (1990).  China, in fact, is now skillfully capitalizing on global 
capitalists (i.e., multinationals) as the most helpful servant for its authoritarian 
communism.  And Wade (2010) sees even a more important role for industrial policy 
emerge in this post-2008 crisis world economy.  Indeed, “the global revival of industrial 
policy” may lead to the rise of state capitalism or “Leviathan Inc.”19 (as hinted in Figure 
1).  
                                                 
19 “Leviathan Inc.” and “Picking winners, saving losers,” Economist,  August 7, 2010, p.9 and pp. 68-70. 
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     In this regard, it is often said that “Like fire, the market is a good servant, but a poor 
master” (Eatwell, 1982).  Put differently, the market is basically neither goal-setting nor 
goal-pursuing; it is goal-neutral at best and sometimes even goal-hindering.  In essence, 
the market is merely a resource-allocative mechanism, not a goal-oriented and –filling 
entity (Ozawa, 2005).  Directions need to be given by states that represent collective 
desires at the national level.   Effective masters are in great demand.           
 
6.  Comparative Advantage Recycling in Labor-Intensive Industries—with the U.S.  
     as the First Lead Goose 
 
What has happened so favorably in East Asia owes to the convergence of three earlier 
structural dynamisms: (i) the United States pioneered in the development of new R&D-
driven industries such as computers, microchips, and information technology, (ii) Japan 
moved up the ladder of development from the lower tiers by first modernizing the war-
torn light industries and heavy/chemical industries (that had already been established 
before WWII) and then by entering into, and innovating in, higher-tier industries 
(especially automobiles and consumer electronics), as its wages and currency rose and its 
capital deepening proceeded, and (iii) other East Asian countries at lower stages of 
development soon initiated catch-up growth by first developing labor-intensive 
manufacturing for export, one group of economies at a time in a staggered sequence--first 
the NIEs, then the ASEAN-4, and more recently China and Vietnam. 
     In the postwar period, the United States, the hegemon of postwar capitalism, adopted a 
liberal trade policy toward Asia, especially during the Cold War.  It has been providing 
the major market for Asia’s exports of labor-intensive goods, such as apparel, furniture, 
and sundries.  Furthermore, the U.S. import markets for such goods, the markets once 
captured but soon discarded by Japan, were quickly handed over to the NIEs, which in 
turn soon relayed them to the ASEAN-4—and more recently to China.  This pattern of 
comparative advantage recycling in the U.S. import markets for labor-intensive goods is 
evidenced in Figure 3. 
 
***INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE*** 
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      It can be seen that on average Japan lost its lead to the NIEs at the start of the 1970s.  
The NIEs were able to attain a rising market share until the early 1980s and then, in turn, 
began to experience a rapid decline in market share; in 1992 they were finally taken over 
by China.  The rise in the ASEAN-4’s share was rather moderate and was likewise 
overtaken by China in 1982.  By 1997, the shares of both the NIEs and Japan had 
dwindled and fallen behind both China and the ASEAN-4, whose exports of labor-
intensive goods to the U.S. had started soaring in the mid-1980s onward.  China’s such 
soaring exports to the U.S. have been made possible by foreign multinationals’ export-
oriented investments and outsourcing operations attracted to, and induced by, China’s 
low-wages and its huge potential domestic market after it opened the doors for the global 
economy in 1978.  This shifting pattern of comparative advantages may be called 
“comparative advantage or market recycling” (Ozawa, 2005).  U.S. markets for labor-
intensive manufactures have been serving as export markets repeatedly for Asian 
economies one after another in a staggered fashion, resulting in export-led growth 
multiplication as the U.S. markets were passed down the East Asian hierarchy of 
economies.                                                  
     For a successful recycling of comparative advantages to occur, it is imperative for 
upper-echelon countries to climb up the chain of value-added quickly and willingly shed 
and relay their increasingly comparatively disadvantaged production onto lower-echelon 
countries.  In other words, their capacities to metamorphose themselves structurally are 
one key enabling factor.  In this regard, Japan and the NIEs, not to speak of the U.S., 
have clearly demonstrated such capacity--in part because of their institutional 
flexibilities, notably in the labor markets. 
     It is now easy to understand that the United States has clearly been the first lead 
goose; it is the major myth that Japan was the lead goose that had led the gaggle of flying 
geese, the myth adopted in those writings (e.g., Pempel, 1996/9720) that criticize the FG 
theory by “barking at the wrong tree,” so to speak.  True, Japan did contribute to the 
                                                 
20 Pempel (1996-67, p. 16) rather sarcastically states “… Japan, of course, would remain the country 
destined to lead all regional development and would control all leading technologies and industries, but by 
following Japan’s lead along a common trajectory, other countries would quickly benefit.   …The implicit 
arrogance of a permanent place at the front of the avian Asian advance seems never to have been 
challenged by most Japanese advocates of the model.” 
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vitality of FG formation as a key supplier of industrial inputs and technologies mostly 
through FDI, but so did the NIEs as they moved up the ladder of development.  If there 
had not been for U.S. leadership and its role as the major provider of demand, a FG 
formation of tandem growth would have never occurred in the first place.  
 
7.  Borrowed Growth: The Role of Finance in Catch-up Growth 
How a catching-up country may climb the ladder of economic development is examined 
above.  So far, however, we have looked only at the real-sector (though we did briefly 
touch on the role of exchange rates as a prompter of industrial upgrading).  It is time to 
take account of the financial dimension of industrial upgrading.  How are the different 
stages of growth financed?  What is the role of the government in financial development 
at different stages?  We will first consider the notion of “borrowed growth” as the critical 
feature of US-led growth clustering.    
 
7.1. Borrowed Growth 
Any developing country at the start of industrialization must cope with a situation in 
which internal savings (S) tend to be exceeded by domestic investment (I).  Hence, how 
to cover this inherent deficiency of savings is a critical issue in formulating an effective 
strategy for economic growth.  Any open economy that invests more than it saves at 
home will end up with a well-known Keynesian disequilibrium in which the current 
account (CA) becomes negative (namely, CA = S - I, assuming a balanced government 
budget).  And this CA deficit needs to be financed by capital inflows (that is, external 
borrowings), since CA necessarily equals the financial account (FA).  The FA keeps track 
of capital inflows and outflows.  In other words, rapid growth is financed by a surplus on 
the FA or a net capital inflow (foreign savings).  This type of CA-deficit-based growth 
may be called “borrowed growth.” 
        Borrowed growth is a double-edged sward.  Helped by capital inflows, “input-
driven” industrialization a la Krugman (1994) is made possible, and in fact, accelerated. 
Such growth leads to a boom, which itself in turn attracts more capital inflows, 
stimulating further growth in a virtuous circle.  At the same time, however, once foreign 
investors sense some danger of weakness in the borrowing country’s performance, a herd 
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mentality takes over.  This causes an abrupt and exaggerated reversal in capital flows—
and a sudden slump and bust.  All this corresponds to the familiar pattern of “manias, 
panics and crashes” (Kindleberger, 1996).   
 
7.2. Stages of Growth and Balance-of-Payments 
Borrowed growth, which occurs in developing and advanced countries alike, can be best 
understood in terms of the stages theory of the balance of payments (BOP).  Rapidly 
growing developing countries are likely to experience CA deficits at the start.  Once they 
succeed in building a strong industrial base, CA (especially merchandise trade) surpluses 
become their BOP characteristic.  In contrast, fully developed and mature countries are 
prone to CA deficits (largely because of merchandise trade deficits, if not yet CA deficits 
because invisible trade and investment incomes may be in surplus).  In other words, BO 
conditions can be interpreted as a matter of how much advanced a country is in economic 
development—that is, they depend on growth stages.  Management of BOP, therefore, 
requires different policy responses along the path of growth.  
     More specifically, Crowther (1957) classifies such a long-term trend in growth-driven 
BOP conditions into six stages: (i) “immature debtor-borrower” (a deepening CA deficit), 
(ii) “mature debtor-borrower” (a declining CA deficit), (iii) “debtor-lender and debtor-
repayer” (a rising CA surplus), (iv) “immature creditor-lender” (a record-high CA 
surplus), (v) “mature creditor-lender” (a declining CA deficit), (vi) “creditor-drawer and 
borrower” (a rising CA deficit).  This six-stage model gives us a starting point for our 
own analysis. 
 
7.2.1. The “perilous CA-deficit” stage 
When an underdeveloped economy opens up for trade and investment at the start of 
economic development, its CA registers a growing deficit, especially if left to free market 
forces without any restrictions on cross-border transactions.  This corresponds to the 
transition period from the “take-off” to the “sustained growth” stage (in the words of 
Rostow, 1966).  During such a transitional period, capital goods, technologies, modern 
business services, and hitherto-unavailable consumer goods are all necessarily imported 
from the advanced world to develop the country’s industrial base and domestic markets.  
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Whatever it can produce (normally primary goods) is exported, but this may be not 
sufficient to cover the costs of imports.  A resultant CA deficit needs to be financed by 
borrowing from abroad.  As the economy succeeds in industrialization, however, this 
deficit is eventually reversed and eliminated. 
     Stated in terms of Crowther’s theory of BOP, the above-described situation matches 
the first two stages of “debtor-borrower.”  These early stages represent the most critical, 
danger-laden period for a developing country, since its rising CA deficits require more 
and more foreign borrowings unless otherwise controlled—and it plunges deeper and 
deeper into debts with ballooning interest payments.  (This kind of situations is still 
prevalent in many developing African countries.)   This tendency is all the more 
pronounced if exchange rates are fixed, since domestic borrowers are falsely assured that 
their debts specified in foreign currencies are the same as home-currency debts.  Yet an 
“unexpected” devaluation of home currency, which may be triggered by sudden capital 
withdrawals by foreign lenders and investors, would wreak havoc to the debtors (as 
happened in the Asian crisis of 1997-8).  This period can, therefore, be identified as the 
“perilous CA-deficit phase” (see Figure 4). 
 
***INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE*** 
 
7.2.2. The “robust CA-surplus” stage  
On the other hand, the subsequent two stages of “creditor-lender” are accompanied by 
CA surpluses (first rising and then declining), the phase that can be called the “robust 
CA-surplus phase.”  Those countries that have reach this phase are at the height of their 
industrialization drive, in which the secondary sector (manufacturing and construction) 
dominates, serving as the primary engine of growth—with a shrinking share of the 
primary sector and a rising share of the tertiary (service) sector (Clark, 1935).   They are 
heavily specialized in “making goods” and their rising incomes derive from investment-
driven growth (i.e., investing in productive capacity)—and from export revenues.  In 
particular, domestic output and exports in manufacturing industry are mutually 
reinforcing, making the logic of cumulative causation (or virtuous cycle) work (Kaldor, 
1985; Eatwell, 1982). 
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     In fact, the rapidly catching-up Asian countries have been able to swiftly leave behind 
the perilous and enter the robust CA phase through a variety of policy measures. 
Moreover, a massive inflow of capital, especially in the form of FDI by MNCs that bring 
advanced technology, leads to a substantial CA surplus--as best witnessed in China’s and 
Vietnam’s export booms.            
 
7.2.3. The “mature CA-deficit” stage 
Finally, the last two stages of ‘creditor-drawer and borrower’ may be labeled the ‘mature 
CA-deficit phase’.  As a secular trend, the mature advanced countries are likely to stay in 
this phase, though they may temporarily record surpluses.21 How can, then, these deficit-
prone countries cope with the deficit?  In the first place, they can live off their past 
overseas investments abroad—that is, their investment incomes may be substantially 
large enough to minimize and keep the deficit at a manageable level.  In addition, they 
are normally capable of attracting capital inflows easily because they enjoy high credit-
rating and offer an attractive business environment for foreign MNCs.  Some enjoy the 
privilege of having their currencies used as reserves by other countries.  They are thus 
able to reap seigniorage by “exporting” their own currencies as financial assets.  Their 
CA deficits can thus be maintained so long as the rest of the world is willing to hold their 
currencies.  All these situations may combine to create a favorable condition in which 
some advanced countries enjoy an unusually prolonged period of borrowed growth, as 
has been the case with the US. 
     It should be noted in passing that many developing countries in the perilous CA-
deficit stage may constantly experience downward pressure on their currencies, if 
domestic prices rise, leading to overvaluation under fixed exchange rates--or to persistent 
depreciation under flexible rates—before they transit to the next phase.  On the other 
hand, those countries in the robust CA-surplus stage experience exactly the opposite.   
And those advanced countries in the mature CA-deficit stage are likely go through 
frequent exchange rate fluctuations as they allow the market to determine their exchange 
                                                 
21At the moment, Germany and Japan are the outliers from the general trend depicted in the above model 
because of their traditional strong emphasis on manufacturing.  They are, nevertheless, closer to the end of 
the “robust CA-surplus” stage and may not continuously record surpluses year after year.    
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rates.  Unless their economies are badly managed, they can avoid any serious currency 
crisis. 
 
7.2.4. “Global (G2) imbalances” 
The above stages model of BOP shows that payments imbalances are structurally 
determined by different stages of economic development.  And the growth-driven 
fundamental pattern of the CA trend curve (shown in Fig. 4) is normally altered by 
existing macroeconomic policy (i.e., fiscal and monetary) and propensities (consumption 
and saving) and currency policy (fixed, managed, and flexible exchange rates).   Hence 
the size of a surplus or a deficit may be magnified (or reduced).   This is actually the case 
with China’s huge (magnified) CA surplus largely  as a result of its strong export 
orientation and the yuan’s growing undervaluation (situational/aberrant policy factors on 
China’s side)—and with the U.S.’s recent large CA deficits reflecting its rising fiscal 
deficits, easy money, and low savings rate (situational/aberrant policy factors on the U.S. 
side).  And these situational factors on the both sides of the Pacific have converged in 
magnifying the G2 imbalances.   
     Nevertheless, the fundamental CA conditions inherent in different stages of growth 
underline the nature of the G2 imbalances that accompanied the recent growth of the 
world economy brought about under U.S.-led global capitalism.  Hence, exchange rate 
adjustments alone cannot restore global balances.  And both China’s and the U.S.’s 
“abnormally” large CA imbalances are precisely the outcome of their complimentary 
situational policies pursued under the U.S. leadership that has encouraged China to open 
up and adopt a capitalist approach to economic growth.22            
 
7.3. Financial/Money vs. Industrial/Real Sectors: Interaction 
CA and FA represent the two sectors of an open economy--the former the 
“industrial/real” sector, and the latter the “financial/money” sector, respectively.  They 
necessarily interact closely in the course of economic development.  Real-sector 
                                                 
22 This does not mean that the CA deficits of the U.S. are entirely attributable to China’s CA surpluses.  
The U.S. trade deficit with China is, however, one of the largest among U.S. trade partners, and most 
importantly, China is the largest recycler of dollars back to the U.S. Treasuries market, causing a FA-
pushed CA deficit (to be explained below).   
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transactions require money-sector ones for finance and settlement of trade accounts, but 
the latter often becomes “autonomous” (no longer “accommodating”) in this age of fast 
capital flows, compelling CA instead to accommodate. 
     In short, an open economy (S = I + CA) has a higher degree of freedom in 
development finance than a closed economy (S = I), because the former can avail itself of 
its external balance (CA [= FA]).  For a closed economy, domestic savings are the only 
source of finance, and if domestic savings are not sufficient, it is constrained from 
growth.   An open economy can rely on borrowing from overseas as supplements to 
domestic savings in order to grow.  In this case, CA transactions are autonomous—or 
masters, so to speak, while FA transactions are accommodating—or servants.   This 
means that the more open a growing economy is to capital inflows into its productive 
capacity-building investment, the higher the rate of growth.   Borrowed growth, however, 
is accompanied by high risks of excessive capital inflows.  A sudden surge in capital 
inflows may not be properly channeled into productive capital formation, spilling into 
unproductive, purely speculative types of investment--hence into a greater CA deficit.  
The domestic need for capital formation may thus be overwhelmed by unnecessary huge 
capital inflows.  The upshot is a role reversal; FA transactions become “masters,” 
whereas CA transactions become “servants,”      
     Moreover, in the context of borrowed growth with unfettered capital flows across 
borders, rapid growth exposes a developing country to the forces of cumulative 
causation, upward as well as downward, which are generated in both the industrial and 
the financial sectors simultaneously.  These forces would cause both “super-growth” and 
“super-crisis” (magnified boom-and-bust cycles) as explained in the following scenario:  
(a) High domestic investment (initially accompanied by high savings) Æ (b) high growth 
Æ (c) capital inflows Æ (d) super-growth (acceleration) Æ (e) more capital inflows Æ 
(f) a danger of inflation (due to a rise in money supply caused by capital inflows) and 
diminished investment opportunities in the industrial sector Æ (g) speculative and 
excessive investment in the financial sector (resulting in the rising price of securities, 
commodities, and real estate) Æ (h) signs of a collapse (busting) of a bubble Æ (i) 
defaults on domestic debts Æ (j) hot global money to the exists Æ (k) depletion of 
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official reserves (under fixed exchange rates) Æ (l) currency crisis (home currency 
meltdown) Æ (m) defaults on foreign debts Æ (n) super currency/financial crisis.   
     The boom (super-growth) period is covered by the first-half sequence of (a) through 
(g), while the bust (super-crisis) is represented by the second-half sequence of (h) through 
(n).  The whole sequence involves spiraling interactions (initially complementary and 
augmenting but later on deleterious and subversive) between the industrial and the 
financial sectors. 
 
7.3.1. Two genres of BOP imbalances: “CA-pulled” vs. “FA-pushed” 
As mentioned above, there has recently been a role reversal between CA transactions and 
FA ones.  The former used to be “masters,” and the latter “servants,” in the sense that 
trade is financed and settled by accompanying financial transactions.  The latter merely 
facilitate the former.  When the Bretton Woods system of pegged exchange rates early on 
permitted discretionary controls on short-term capital flows, trade, and foreign 
exchanges, CA transactions used to be the primary/autonomous part of international 
economic activities, whereas their FA counterparts merely played the secondary 
/accommodating role by financing CA transactions.  These were the standard 
characterizations of CA and FA that were accepted and taught in international economics 
(see, for example, Meade’s (1951) definitive tome on the theory of BOP). 
 
7.3.2. CA-pulled type: internally originated deficits  
In those days, CA deficits, when they appeared, were the result of an internal 
disequilibrium caused by an excess of aggregate demand over aggregate supply (output) 
at home, as best stipulated in the Keynesian “absorption” theory of BOP (Alexander, 
1953).  CA deficits were regarded as the consequence of a country “living beyond its 
means” (since CA = Y – absorption [C + I + G]).  To correct a serious CA deficit, 
therefore, tight macroeconomic policies (monetary as well as fiscal) were called for and 
applied to reduce domestic expenditures.  The best way for an economy to grow was then 
to raise domestic savings to finance domestic investment, since capital flows were 
“imperfect” due to restrictions under the Bretton Woods system. 
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     Indeed, the BOP served as a strict guidepost for macroeconomic stabilization. Those 
countries that could not manage BOP had to seek a bailout from the IMF.  The IMF, 
however, imposed so-called “conditionalities” or austerity program on the borrowing 
governments to solve internal disequilibrium (excessive spending).  The governments 
thus had to implement IMF-prescribed deflationary policies to force themselves to live 
“within their means.”  If an austerity diet was judged unworkable, the IMF allowed a 
devaluation of currency in the face of “fundamental disequilibrium.”  These IMF 
prescriptions—the austerity program and devaluation—were considered appropriate and 
effective to deal with internally originated (CA-caused) BOP crises, since capital flows 
(FA transactions) remained largely controlled. 
 
7.3.3. FA-pushed type: externally caused deficits 
With liberalization of cross-border capital movements and rising liquidity sloshing 
around the global economy, however, the whole situation began to change.  Pure 
financial transactions have grown ever larger in volume as an autonomous type of capital 
flows (especially, hot money) and have risen in importance, overwhelming CA 
transactions.23  When other types of capital flows which are not transacted through the 
foreign exchange markets (e.g., physical flows of hard currencies such as the U.S. dollar 
and the Euro to be used as a store of value outside of the U.S. and the Eurozone—and 
illegal transactions) are included, the volume of capital flows is even much greater.   
     Be that as it may, most capital flows (especially, portfolio investments and bank loans) 
are primary and autonomous—and no longer secondary and accommodating in the 
traditional sense.  When a country is flooded with capital inflows (hence, a huge surplus 
on its FA), it is compelled either to let currency appreciate (under flexible exchange 
rates) or to inflate its economy (under fixed exchange rates).  This expansionary pressure 
caused by imported liquidity in turn leads to a CA deficit for the very purpose of relieving 
such pressure via increased imports.  Even if the country’s CA deficit rises, it is still 
possible that its currency remains overvalued.  This outcome may be called the 
“continuing CA deficit but still strong currency” paradox, as experienced by the U.S. for 
                                                 
23 According to a recent BIS survey, the daily global volume of currency transactions in foreign exchange 
markets hit $4 trillion, as reported in “Currency Trading Soars,” Wall Street Journal, Sept. 1, 2010, A1.   
This is by far larger than the value of global trade in goods and services. 
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many decades.  This type of CA deficits is an externally originated (FA-pushed) BOP 
imbalance where FA transactions become masters (causes) and CA transactions servants 
(effects), an imbalance that is diametrically opposite to the traditional internally 
originated (CA-pulled) BOP imbalance where the CA is still a master and the FA is a 
servant (Ozawa, 2009). 
     At the time of the Asian financial crisis of 1996-7 the IMF was severely criticized for 
its continued imposition of the outdated austerity programs on the bailed-out Asian 
governments.  Those stricken Asian countries had been maintaining fundamentally sound 
macroeconomic conditions: relatively well-balanced budgets, stable money supplies, and 
price stability.  In the case of the Asian crisis, those debtors were mostly the private 
banks which borrowed from overseas in foreign currencies (mostly the U.S. dollar) and 
lent to domestic firms in local currencies.  When the ties of their currencies to the dollar 
were broken as a consequence of depleted international reserves, the debtors were no 
longer able to repay.  Consequently, the IMF’s conventional prescriptions made things 
worse.  The bailed-out economies were driven into a severe slump by high interest rates 
and tight fiscal conditions.  Businesses collapsed, causing even more bad loans, thereby 
sparking a banking crisis.  Banks contracted loans and precipitated a credit crunch.  The 
conventional IMF remedies that were once developed to cope with internally originated 
(CA-pulled) BOP imbalances proved to be not a medicine but rather a poison for those 
countries with externally originated (FA-pushed) BOP imbalances. 
     It can be generalized, therefore, that when an economy is still under-industrialized and 
its financial sector underdeveloped (i.e., still in their early stages of development), it is 
prone to internally originated BOP imbalances, and that as the economy successfully 
scales the ladder of economic development, attracting capital inflows into its financial 
markets, it tends increasingly to succumb to externally originated BOP imbalances.       
   
7.4.   Borrowed Growth and Financial Crisis 
The “East Asian miracle” and the “East Asian debacle” of 1997-8, which occurred in 
tandem, are nothing but the results of excessive debts created through liberalized 
financial markets by way of hot money inflows.  This exaggerated swing from miracle 
(super-growth) to debacle (super-crisis) represents the perils of borrowed growth.  A 
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string of currency and financial crises that East Asia, Latin America, and Russia 
experienced in the 1980s and 1990s was due to the mismanagement (or “non-
management”) of borrowed growth—and due to institutional inadequacy and 
inappropriate policy responses.  Also, advanced and mature economies would likewise 
experience the similar outcome of borrowed growth, as more recently seen in the U.S., 
Iceland, and Greece.    
 
7.4.1. Borrowed growth, the “perverted” American Dream, and the financial crisis 
The U.S. economy has been, and still is, operating in a mode of borrowed growth.  Its 
economic expansion has been supported by large capital inflows that can supplement or 
rather substitute for domestic savings.  Its CA deficit escalated toward nearly $1 trillion 
in 2008—say, from about $300 billion at the end of the 1990s.  It has recently hovered 
around 6.5% of GDP.   Combined with the banking crisis in the wake of the subprime 
mortgage debacle, America’s borrowed growth has finally begun to cause a sharp fall of 
the U.S. dollar, starting in the early 2008. 
     However, the U.S. has long enjoyed some unique positions despite its heavy debt to 
the rest of the world.  First of all, it is not so much U.S. borrowers but foreign investors 
who bring money to America’s financial markets.  The U.S. is not really “borrowing” in 
the real sense of the term in order to finance its CA deficit—that is, a situation of 
internally originated (CA-pulled) BOP imbalances.  Excepting some political opposition 
to foreign interests’ attempts to buy out America’s “strategic” companies, America 
allows free capital inflows to fuel its economic growth.  Such inflows of foreign savings 
result in an ever-growing CA deficit—that is, a situation of externally originated (FA-
pushed) BOP imbalances.   
     Ever since the end of WWII, furthermore, the U.S. has been arguably a safe haven for 
many foreign investors. It is one of the most political stable countries where reliable 
securities (most of all, Treasury securities) and sophisticated (often high risk but high 
return) private financial instruments are in abundant supply.  In contrast, those export-
driven developing countries that rapidly accumulate large hoards of exchange reserves 
lack such well-developed financial markets at home for the very simple reason that they 
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are not fully developed yet.  In this sense, they are engaged not so much in interest 
arbitrage as in institutional arbitrage.       
     In addition, the U.S. dollar, despite its fall, has been the world’s dominant currency, 
allowing a high level of tolerance for a CA deficit.  In a sense, the U.S. dollar itself can 
be looked upon as America’s major “export.”  In most of the time the dollar has been a 
good (even superior) substitute for gold (which Keynes even called ‘barbaric’), and the 
global economy has come to operate effectively on a dollar standard.   
     Nevertheless, America’s borrowed growth hit a snag in September 2008 after the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers—and the rest is history.  The epicenter of the crisis was an 
implosion of the subprime mortgage market that had been created basically by the U.S. 
Federal Housing Administration (FHA) (Norberg, 2009).  At the core, it was no doubt the 
outcome of the perverted American Dream--perverted in the sense that the Dream is not 
self-driven and -attained but government-provided.  The trade modality of borrowed 
growth (“import both cheap capital and low-price goods as much possible--mostly from 
China”), in which the U.S. economy had come to be trapped, created the ideal 
environment where the Federal Reserve was able to keep interest rates low without 
worries about inflation, thereby funding the subprime market and speculations in 
newfangled financial instruments.   All this converged to produce the perfect storm of 
financial crisis.       
 
8.  Concluding Remarks 
So, what is the essence of the FG theory of economic development as it has been 
elaborated on and reformulated in this paper?   It is a theory of catch-up structural 
upgrading (hence, economic development) by means of interactions within a hierarchy of 
closely integrated economies that is currently governed by hegemon.-led capitalism.  It 
explains how stepped-up integration with the outside economy via trade and investment 
can assist any aspiring developing country to jumpstart and sustain rapid structural 
metamorphosis and economic growth.  Such an outer-dependent strategy enables a 
developing country to scale the ladder of economic development by capitalizing on 
economies of hierarchical concatenation—that is, by exploiting the growth stimuli 
engendered by the hegemon, the United States, and other advanced countries.   A 
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hierarchy—i.e., an FG formation of aligned countries-- matters, since it can avail itself of, 
and in turn generate, positive externalities within the hierarchy.  The constituent countries 
can catch up and grow much faster than when they try to industrialize on their own.  This 
is the logic of FG formation that can exploit economies of concatenation (a 70%-range 
energy saving over a goose flying solo).   It is, therefore, imperative upon any developing 
country, if it intends to industrialize and catch up in economic and technological 
development, to open up its economy and judiciously submit itself to the forces of 
globalization. 
     In order to effectively take advantage of external opportunities, the country must adopt 
business-friendly institutions compatible with the principles of market capitalism.  This 
does not mean, however, that it blindly follows and bends to the market forces (as once 
seen in the unqualified acceptance of the “Washington Consensus”).   The FG model of 
the ladder of economic development (i.e., the logic of industrial upgrading) clearly points 
up the key role to be played by government in (i) implementing market-friendly reforms 
strategically, if not overnight (e.g., setting up “capitalist enclaves” as the first step and 
gradually spreading their logic to the rest of the economy), (ii) enhancing/facilitating the 
market mechanism by solving the problem of coordination failures as the country climbs 
up the rungs toward higher-tier industries, and (iii) minimizing/alleviating the ill effects 
of market activities such as the environmental problems and  income inequality (i.e., by 
spreading the fruits of rapid growth via the policy of “shared growth”). 
     In addition to the real-sector story of a FG formation (i.e., the newly defined notion of 
the ladder of economic development), a financial side story is presented above in terms of 
the three-stage model of BOP; the “precarious CA-deficit” stage, the “robust CA-surplus” 
stage, and the “mature CA-deficit” stage.  The BOP deficits are classified into two types; 
the CA-pulled deficit (conventional and internally originated kind) and the FA-pushed 
type (new and externally caused kind).  The U.S. operates in the mature CA-deficit stage 
but fell deep into the trap of the FA-pushed type.  In contrast, China is in the robust CA-
surplus stage, an inverted mirror image of the U.S.   Their BOP conditions have been 
complementary with each other, and are merely the different sides of the same coin. 
     It is nowadays often said that mainstream (neoclassical) growth theory has become 
irrelevant to the needs of policymakers.  A recent IMF journal, Finance & Development 
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(March 2006), had feature articles on “Understanding Growth.”   The underlying theme 
of this special issue is “the economics profession’s discouraging quest for answers 
through decades of growth research;” this is because there has developed an ever-
widening gap (tensions) between “the logics of academic interest and the needs of the 
policy practitioners” (Pritchett, 2006, p. 18).   As a consequence, it is said that 
“[E]conomists are reconsidering what they really know about economic growth and how 
to go about formulating policies in the absence of reliable models” (Zagha, Nankani, and 
Gill, 2006, p. 7, emphasis added).  Neoclassical development economics is clearly in 
disarray. 
     Surprisingly, however, not much attention has been paid to the FG theory of 
economic development for whatever reasons.  Perhaps this is in part because of its 
erstwhile underdeveloped status as theory, particularly as a formalized mathematical 
or econometric model with which mainstream economics is excessively obsessed.24  
Romer (1993, p. 549) observes the predominant logic of academic interest as 
follows: “…over time, economists relied increasingly on mathematics as the 
language of intellectual discourse.  As they did, objects took precedence over ideas 
for purely technical reasons…  Ideas—like Adam Smith’s closely related notion of 
specialization and the division of labor—were pushed aside as the mathematical 
assumption of convexity and the behavioral assumption of price-taking took on 
greater importance in economic reasoning.”25  Here, however, the FG theory of 
economic development as a major doctrine of catch-up growth (as identified by 
Radelet and Sachs) gives a ray of hope, since it has been an effective, field-tested 
doctrine in connection with East Asia’s phenomenal growth and has recently been 
more and more elaborated on for policy relevancy, as has been done in this paper—
and elsewhere (Ozawa, 2009).  After all, a FG way of development thinking is its 
focus on the dynamics of structural change along the path of development and 
                                                 
24 Krugman (1995) explains that big development ideas, such as a “big push” and “balanced vs. unbalanced 
growth,” did not have a lasting impact on mainstream development economics simply because they failed 
to be formalized as mathematical models. 
25  Similarly, with respect to statistical testing, Romer (1993, p. 454) stresses that “the mainstream 
economic community would gain a great deal by moving beyond its narrow focus on statistical hypothesis 
testing and making explicit use of the broad range of evidence that the dissidents have been able to exploit.  
The correlations in macroeconomic data can suggest orders of magnitudes of possible effects, but will 
never be able to resolve the most important questions about causality.”   
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growth.  In this regard, the FG models newly introduced in this paper can constitute 
the vital part of what is now emerging as “new structural economics,” a new 
discipline in the field of development economics (Lin, 2010). 
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          Figure 3     U.S. import market shares for labor-intensive goods    















Note:  Labor-intensive goods consist of textiles (SITC 65), non-metallic mineral  
           manufactures (SITC 66), furniture (SITC 82), travel goods, handbags, etc. 
           (SITC 83), clothing (SITC 84), and footwear (SITC 85).  
 
Source:  Adopted from H. Cutler, D. Berri, and T. Ozawa (2003), “Market Recycling in 
              Labor-intensive Goods, Flying-geese Style: An Empirical Analysis of East Asian  
              Exports to the U.S.,” Journal of Asian Economics, 14, 35-50.  
 
                            Figure 4         Structural transformation and balance-of-payments stages:   The U.S. in the “mature CA-deficit” phase,  
                                                  while China in the “robust CA-surplus” phase, magnified by institutional/policy factors. 
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